“Capital punishment be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all.” Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982).
Ever since the death penalty was reinstated nationally in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), it seems there is always some debate about whether or not the death penalty is applied in a discriminatory manner. There are on-going discussions whether the death penalty is applied disproportionately against certain races or sex.
Without taking a stance as to if the system currently discriminates or not, I argue in my paper “Correcting a Fatal Lottery” that the system for adjudicating discrimination claims in the death penalty is unconstitutional. I argue that there are two different systems of adjudicating discrimination: one for the death penalty and another for every other type of discrimination claim.
In the death penalty context, claims of discrimination use the evidentiary standard of “exceptionally clear proof.” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987). Whether there is exceptionally clear proof of discrimination is argued in a single step. Both sides make their arguments and the judge then makes her determination.
Every other type of discrimination – employment discrimination, housing discrimination, reverse-racial discrimination, racial profiling by police, racial profiling by private security, racial gerrymandering, qualified immunity by a state prison guard, qualified immunity by city officials and police, felon disenfranchisement laws, and discrimination in jury venire – are decided with a burden shifting system using the preponderance of the evidence standard. The burden shifting standard allows the judge to organize evidence so it can be more easily digested. The preponderance of the evidence standard is which ever side has the more convincing evidence shall win. See e.g. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (employment discrimination in a mixed-motive case); Lindsay v. Yates, 578 F.3d 407, 421 (6th Cir. 2009) (housing discrimination); Weberg v. Franks, 229 F.3d 514, 522-23 (6th Cir. 2000) (reverse-racial discrimination) etc.
Is it just that claims of discrimination in administering the death penalty not only use a different system, but one that is much more rigorous?
My assertion in the paper is that with a defendant’s life on the line, the judicial system should not impose more strict measures to prove discrimination occurred. If discrimination occurs then it is a flaw within the justice system. We have all seen the pictures of where Lady Justice is blind. If a person is being treated differently because of her sex or her skin color then Lady Justice is not administering proceedings with impartiality. No matter what the crime a person is accused of, justice should be administered fairly and impartially.
This is the first of a series that I will use to break down the argument of my paper detailing the differences in how the courts judge discrimination and why it is unconstitutional.
The race of the victim has been shown to be statistically significant in several studies. Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman era (full text). Prosecutorial Discretion in Requesting the Death Penalty (abstract only).